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Abstract 
Using a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries we explore how creditors influence dividend payouts in 
various disclosure regimes. Poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the practice by firms in opaque 
regimes of using large dividend payouts to build reputation capital, and place few restrictions on dividend 
payouts in transparent regimes. In intermediate disclosure regimes creditors place large restrictions on 
dividend payouts. Dividend payouts are always largest in transparent regimes. Our findings say that the 
disclosure standards versions of the outcome and substitution agency models of dividends are not 
mutually-exclusive, and are as effective under weak as they are under strong creditor rights.       
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1. Introduction 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pp. 737) define corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. Investors can 
attempt to safeguard their investment by monitoring the firms they invest in. However, effective 
monitoring is part influenced by the accounting standards which determine the amount and accuracy of 
corporate disclosures. Where corporations provide abundant, accurate and timely disclosures, agency 
costs of debt and equity are low (see Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998). In contrast, where disclosure 
environments are opaque, agency costs arise between corporate insiders and outsiders (see Atanasov et al, 
2007).  
Creditors modify loan contracts to account for poor enforceability of contracts, weak creditor 
rights, and information asymmetry. Bae and Goyal (2009) show that banks reduce the loan amount, 
decrease loan maturity, and increase the cost of debt capital where loan contract violations are poorly 
enforced. In this paper we examine whether creditors take steps beyond modifying the loan contract and 
examine if and to what extent they shape corporate dividend payout policies in various disclosure 
regimes. Brockman and Unlu (2009) explore the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights. 
Creditors permit large dividend payouts where their legal rights are strong, yet poorly-protected creditors 
restrict dividend payouts (the substitution hypothesis). Brockman and Unlu (2011) show that the 
dividend-disclosure relationship is neither positive (the agency “outcome” model says the dividend-
disclosure relationship is positive) nor negative (the agency “substitution” model says the dividend-
disclosure is negative), but “u-shaped”. In opaque regimes, growth firms substitute poor country-level 
disclosure standards with “reputation capital”, which is achieved by establishing a history of paying large 
dividends over time to “convince shareholders that it will invest properly and for their benefit” (see 
Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012, pp. 21; Gan et al., 2014). In transparent regimes where outsiders can better 
observe managerial actions and corporate profitability, dividend payouts are an outcome of strong 
disclosure standards. Where disclosure standards are neither strong nor weak, dividend payouts are much 
lower, a result which Brockman and Unlu (2011) do not try to explain.1   
                                                 
1 Studies prior to Brockman and Unlu (2011), and beginning with La Porta et al. (2000), test the outcome and 
substitution agency models of dividends by exploring the relationship between dividend payouts and the strength of 
shareholder rights (legal rights).   
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In this paper we seek to provide the answers to three questions which arise in light of the 
collective findings of Brockman and Unlu (2009, 2011). First, if growth firms in opaque disclosure 
regimes use large dividend payouts to build trust with outside investors; will they still be able to do so 
given weak creditor rights? In other words, does the disclosure standards version of the agency 
substitution model of dividends hold under weak creditor rights?2 To the best of our knowledge, no study 
to-date has conclusively tested either version (legal rights or accounting standards) of the agency 
substitution models of dividends inclusive of the agency costs of debt. Studies which do find a negative 
dividend – shareholder rights relationship are very often single-country dividend-corporate governance 
studies (see Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; and Chae et al. 2009). These studies make it impossible to test the 
creditor rights inclusive agency substitution model of dividends, as creditor rights are constant within 
countries.3 In an international multi-country setting where creditor rights vary across countries, Brockman 
and Unlu (2011) present strong evidence in favour of the disclosure standards version of the substitution 
model, which makes tests of this model inclusive of the agency costs of debt possible.  
  Second, we examine if the disclosure standards version of the outcome model of dividends 
holds under weak creditor rights? Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) show that the 
shareholder rights version of the outcome model of dividends is most effective under strong shareholder 
and strong creditor rights; dividend payouts are reduced where shareholder rights are strong (the 
shareholder rights outcome model of dividends), yet creditor rights weak (the creditor rights substitution 
model of dividends). Tests of the disclosure standards version of the outcome model of dividends 
inclusive of the agency costs of debt have yet to be performed.  
Finally, we test the dividend-creditor rights relationship in intermediate disclosure regimes to test 
whether the low dividend payouts which we observe in intermediate regimes are caused by the inclusion 
of firms from Canada and the U.S., where dividend payouts are low, but crucially, creditor rights weak.      
                                                 
2
 The idea that firms can build capital market reputation using dividend payout is not new. Campbell and Turner 
(2011) find evidence to support the agency substitution model of dividends in Victorian Britain. Agarwal (2013) 
finds support in favour of the outcome model in early 1900s United States.      
3 Another problem with these single country studies is that their findings appear to be influenced by the corporate 
governance measured used. Jiraporn and Ning (2006) and Chae et al. (2009) find support in favour of the 
substitution model. Also using U.S. firms, but different corporate governance measures, Jiraporn et al. (2011) find 
support in favour of the outcome model of dividends.  
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We argue that the answer to the first question is not obvious since there are valid reasons why 
creditors may not restrict dividend payouts in opaque disclosure regimes. The bonding costs borne by 
reputation-building firms may be sufficiently large to offset the agency costs of debt associated with poor 
creditor rights and/or weak disclosure standards and build trust with creditors. Large stable dividend 
payouts paid over time can built trust with creditors and reduce the agency costs of debt if they; first, 
reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and the risk of overinvestment which can reduce creditors’ 
claims on firm assets (see Jensen, 1986); second, the issue of new shares expose firms to the additional 
scrutiny of capital markets (see Easterbrook, 1984); and third, if reputation building increases the market 
value of the firm and in turn the market value of the firm’s debt holdings (see Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 
1984). Therefore in opaque regimes creditors may view large dividend payouts as beneficial to their own 
needs and may not restrict dividends payouts given weak creditor rights. 
In relation to the second question, we hypothesize that poorly-protected creditors may not place 
large restrictions on dividend payouts in transparent regimes as they do in strong shareholder rights 
regimes. This is because they may view strong disclosure laws as a viable substitute for weak creditor 
rights. Strong shareholder rights likely benefit shareholders alone, yet strong disclosure laws reduce the 
agency costs of debt and equity. 4 Therefore, even given weak legal rights, creditors may not restrict 
dividend payouts to reduce agency costs of debt since abundant disclosures may already serve to do so. In 
this regard, strong disclosure laws may moderate the dividend – creditor rights relationship and reduce 
the need for creditors to use dividend payouts to substitute for weak creditor rights.  
Finally, the agency models of dividends say that dividend payouts should either increase (the 
outcome model) or decrease (the substitution model) as disclosure quality improves, resulting in dividend 
payouts that are lowest in either weak (outcome model) or strong (substitution model) disclosure regimes, 
respectively. These models, which have yet to consider the strength of creditor rights, offer no reason for 
why dividend payouts are actually lowest in intermediate disclosure regimes. The asymmetric dividend 
payout models can offer no explanation either. The theoretical work of Miller and Rock (1985) and others 
say that dividend payouts have information content under the assumption of an information asymmetry 
                                                 
4
 Klock et al. (2005) and Cremers et al. (2007) present for evidence from the U.S. which suggests that bondholders 
frown upon strong shareholder rights. Botosan (1997) and Sengupta (1998) show that the cost of debt and equity 
capital is inversely related to disclosure standards. 
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between insiders and outsiders. These models predict that dividend payouts should be lowest in 
transparent regimes because the information content of dividend payouts is at its lowest here because of 
the abundant disclosures which enrich the information environment (see Howe and Lin, 1992; and Li and 
Zhao, 2008). Therefore, neither the asymmetric or agency models of dividends can explain why dividend 
payouts are lowest in intermediate disclosure regimes. In this paper we consider an alternative 
explanation. We explore the possibility that the low dividend payouts that we observe in intermediate 
regimes are caused by the inclusion of firms from Canada and the U.S., where dividend payouts are low, 
but crucially, creditor rights weak.  
We seek to answer these three questions using a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries. Our 
tests are possible because there is variation in creditor rights and disclosure standards in each disclosure 
and creditor rights regime, respectively. We use Djankov et al’s (2007) creditor right index and the CIFAR 
(1995) disclosure index to capture the strength of creditor rights and accounting standards, respectively. 
We divide our sample of firms into one of three disclosure regimes, namely, high, medium, and low, and 
proceed to estimate the dividend-creditor rights relationship in each regime. A priori, if poorly-protected 
creditors restrict dividend payouts, then we should observe a pronounced positive dividend payout-
creditor rights relationship. If they either do not or place few restrictions on dividend payouts, then we 
should observe that the dividend-creditor rights relationship is much less pronounced, and possibly even 
negative.       
Cho et al. (2014, pg. 40) observe that the “literature on the role of creditor protection in 
corporate financing is in its infancy”. We believe our findings advance this literature in a number of 
important respects. First, we find that in opaque regimes dividend payouts are larger, not smaller, given 
weak creditor rights, resulting in a negative dividend-creditor rights relationship. For whatever reasons, 
poorly-protected creditors allow firms to pay large dividends. The result is that the disclosure standards 
version of the substitution model of dividends holds regardless of the strength of creditor rights. Second, 
the disclosure standards version of the outcome model of dividends is as effective under weak as it is 
under strong creditor rights; dividends remain the largest in transparent regimes regardless of the strength 
of creditor rights. The result is a positive, yet moderate dividend-creditor rights relationship in high 
disclosure regimes. Rich disclosures appear to moderate the dividend-creditor rights relationship. Byrne 
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and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) find that dividend payouts are large under strong creditor and 
shareholder rights, yet are much reduced given weak creditor rights. The findings from this paper, 
together with those of Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013), suggest that creditors view 
strong disclosure standards, but not strong shareholder rights, as beneficial to their own interests. Third, 
and in line with our prior expectations, it is only in intermediate disclosure regimes where poorly-
protected creditors place large restrictions on dividend payouts. The substitution model of dividends 
espoused by Brockman and Unlu (2009) is most evident in intermediate disclosure regimes since it is here 
that we observe the strongest dividend-creditor rights relationship. Where creditor rights are strong, 
dividend payouts in intermediate disclosure regimes are larger than they are under weak creditor rights.   
Finally, the dividend-creditor rights relationships have important implications for the relationship 
between dividends and disclosure quality. Our findings show that the “u-shaped” dividend payout-
disclosure relationship manifests in weak creditor rights regimes alone. Where creditor rights are strong, 
the dividend payout is an outcome of strong disclosure standards; we observe a positive monotonic 
relationship between dividend payouts and disclosure standards. However, dividend payouts remain 
sufficiently large in opaque regimes, so that the agency substitution model continues to hold. Therefore, 
under both strong and weak creditor rights, the disclosure standards versions of the outcome and 
substitution models of dividends hold.    
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the sample and 
variables used in the study. Section 3 analyses our findings, while section 4 concludes.    
 
2. Data and variable descriptions 
We collect firm-level data from Worldscope over the period from 1996 to 2007. Brockman and 
Unlu (2011) use the same sampling period. Our sample of firms consists of 17,544 firms from 28 
countries. We arrive at this final sample after eliminating all firms trading in socialist countries i.e., China, 
Poland, and Hungary, firms trading in Luxembourg, and firms from countries with mandatory dividend 
policies i.e., Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela. We exclude all firms from the financial and 
utility industries using the general industry classification codes from Worldscope, and all firm-years with 
missing or abnormal data i.e. firms with negative net income (earnings), negative total assets, and negative 
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cash flow. To be included in our final sample we require all firms to have at least three years of financial 
data.  
Our two main variables of interest are country-level measures of creditor rights and 
accounting/disclosure standards. We source creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007) and use values for 
the year 2002.5 The creditor rights measure is constructed by summing four dummy variables. These are; 
“no automatic stay on assets”, which is 1 if there is no automatic stay on assets; “secured first” which is 1 
if secured creditors are given priority during the bankruptcy process; “restrict reorganization” which is 1 if 
management cannot file for reorganization unilaterally, and “management no stay” equals 1 if either 
creditors or the courts have the option to change the incumbent management team during bankruptcy 
proceedings. Creditor rights ranges from zero to four with higher values representing greater levels of 
legal creditor protection. We use the CIFAR (1995) country-level disclosure index which we source from 
Hope et al. (2007). This disclosure index is formed by examining and rating companies’ annual reports for 
their inclusion and exclusion of 85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 being the highest standard.   
Creditor rights and disclosure standards are reported for each country in Table 1. Legal 
protection of creditors is particularly strong in Hong Kong and New Zealand, but much less so in France, 
and Mexico. Country-level disclosure ranges from a low of 58 in Turkey to a high of 85 in the United 
Kingdom. Crucial to our analysis is that there is variation in the strength of creditor rights within each 
disclosure regime. If we classify three disclosure regimes as follows: low disclosure with disclosure scores 
ranging from 58 to 71, medium disclosure (72 to 76), and high disclosure (78 and above), creditor rights 
range from 0 to 4, 1 to 4, and 0 to 3, in each of these regimes, respectively.   
We use five dividend payout ratios; dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, dividends-to-
assets, dividends-to-sales, and dividend-payer. Dividend-payer equals 1if the firm pays a dividend in year t 
and zero otherwise. Dividends vary across countries. They are large in New Zealand and Finland, yet 
much smaller in the United States and Canada. Table 1 also reports the number of firm-years and the 
number of firms by country. The United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom contribute the largest 
number of firms which is common in these types of studies.   
3. Empirical analysis 
                                                 
5 We find that our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged when we use creditor rights from different years in 
our regressions.    
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In this section we first examine the relationship between dividend payout, creditor rights, and 
disclosure quality. Then having confirmed the findings from Brockman and Unlu (2009, 2011), we 
proceed to explore the dividend-creditor rights relationship in low, medium, and high disclosure regimes, 
and the dividend-disclosure relationship by strength of creditor rights regimes, respectively. We begin by 
estimating equation 1 using pooled ordinary least squares: 
2
it 1 2 it 3 it 4 it
5 it 6 it it t i it
DIV PAYOUT CREDITOR DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE
CULTURE DIV PREMIUM X Year Industry e
− = α + α + α + α
+α + α − + β + + +    (1) 
Like Brockman and Unlu (2011), in equation 1 we include disclosure together with its square 
(disclosure2). The inclusion of the disclosure-square term by Brockman and Unlu (2011) appears not to be 
motivated by theory, but rather by the existence of a “u-shaped” relationship between dividend payout 
and disclosure quality which is evident from the summary measures which they present in their paper. 
Equation 1 is estimated using dividends-to-cash flow and dividends-to-earnings, as indicated. We include 
firm-level controls, namely size, growth opportunities, leverage, and profitability in all regressions.6 We 
also include a proxy for the dividend premium which captures investor’s appetite for dividend paying 
stocks.7 Each regression also includes a single country-level culture measure, namely uncertainty 
avoidance which we expect to be negatively related to dividend payout (see Hofstede, 1980, 2001).8 Time 
and industry dummies are included but not reported. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered 
by firm (see Petersen, 2009).9  
Table 2 presents our coefficient estimates. Here we present three separate regressions. First, we 
explore the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights alone. Next, we replace creditor 
rights with disclosure and disclosure-squared. In the third regression, creditor rights, disclosure, 
disclosure-squared are included simultaneously along with a full set of firm- and country-level controls, 
industry and time dummies. In all three regressions, the estimated coefficients on the creditor rights 
variable are positive and significant coefficient. They range from 0.028*** to 0.031*** using dividends-to-
                                                 
6 We use log assets to proxy for firm size in all dividend regressions where dividends to earnings or dividends to 
cashflow are the dependent variables. Where we use dividends to assets (sales), we use sales (assets) as the firm size 
proxy.  
7 The dividend premium is measured on an annual basis for each country and is computed as the ratio of the 
average market-to-book ratio of dividend paying firms to the average market-to-book ratio of non-paying firms. We 
expect the coefficient for dividend premium to be positive (see Baker and Wurgler, 2004). 
8 Our findings remain qualitatively the same if we include other culture measures e.g., individualism.   
9 A detailed description of each of these firm- and country-level control variables is provided in appendix 1.                 
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cash flow and 0.031*** to 0.046*** using dividends-to-earnings, and confirm the (creditor) substitution 
hypothesis of Brockman and Unlu (2009).  
Brockman and Unlu (2011) find that the dividend-disclosure relationship is “u-shaped”. We 
confirm that finding here. The estimated coefficient for disclosure is negative (-0.086*** and -0.021*** 
using dividends-to-cash flow) and positive on the disclosure-squared variable (0.001*** and 0.001***) 
indicating that large dividends are paid in the most opaque and transparent regimes. Dividend payouts are 
much lower in intermediate disclosure regimes, a finding which we attempt to explain in the next section.   
In the bottom rows of Table 2 we replace disclosure and disclosure-squared with a series of 
dummy variables which capture low (reference-dummy), medium, and high disclosure regimes, 
respectively.10 When we use these disclosure dummy variables the same “u-shaped” relationship between 
dividend payout and disclosure standards emerges. The coefficient estimates on the “Medium disclosure” 
dummy are always statistically negative. In contrast, the coefficient estimates on the “High disclosure” 
dummy is positive and statistically significant which suggests that dividend payouts are largest in the 
most-transparent regimes.11        
With respect to the firm-level control variables, all are statistically significant and of the expected 
sign. Large, profitable firms, with low leverage and low growth opportunities pay large dividends. The 
coefficient estimates for dividend premium are positive, as expected. We do not find that dividend payout 
is negatively related to uncertainty avoidance as others do.12  
 
Summary measures 
In this section we take a first look at how creditors influence corporate dividend payouts in the 
different disclosure regimes. Consider Figure 1. The top panel presents the average dividend payout ratio 
in each disclosure regime where creditor rights are weak and strong. The bottom panel presents each 
                                                 
10
 The “low disclosure” dummy includes firms from countries whose disclosure scores are less than 71; “medium 
disclosure” uses disclosure scores between 72 and 76, and “high disclosure” includes all firms from countries with a 
disclosure score of 78 and over. We classify the disclosure regimes as we do because it results in us to having 
roughly the same number of countries in each disclosure regime (11 in the low disclosure regime, 7 in the middle, 
and 10 in the high regime), and secondly, have sufficient variation in creditor rights within each disclosure regime.  
11 Along similar lines, Masters et al. (2015) show that contrary to conventional wisdom, financially constrained firms 
pay dividends to increase external financing capacity since larger dividends reduce the costs associated with raising 
equity in a seasoned offering.  
12 Bae et al. (2012) and Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) show that low uncertainty avoidance is significantly associated 
with higher dividend payouts.    
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disclosure regime separately, and outlines the average dividend payout in each regime also by strength of 
creditor rights. Creditor rights are deemed weak one if the creditor right score is at or below the sample 
median of 2. 
 In low disclosure regimes average dividend payouts are actually larger, not smaller, where 
creditor rights are weak. Average dividends-to-cash flow is 12% and 9% under weak and strong creditor 
rights, respectively. These summary payout measures suggest that creditors do not restrict firms in opaque 
regimes from using large dividends to build trust with outside investors.   
Dividends payouts are larger, but only marginally so, in transparent regimes where creditor rights 
are strong. The average dividend paid is 25 percent of earnings where creditor rights strong and 24 
percent where creditor rights are weak. Poorly-protected creditors place fewer restrictions on dividend 
payouts in transparent disclosure regimes than they do where shareholder rights are strong (see Byrne and 
O’Connor, 2012; and Shao et al. 2013). As a result, dividend payouts are always larger in transparent 
regimes, irrespective of the strength of creditor rights.     
Finally, poorly-creditors place the largest restrictions on dividend payouts in intermediate 
disclosure regimes; the average firm pays out 22 percent of its earnings where creditor rights are strong, 
yet only 7 percent where creditor rights are weak. These summary measures lend support to our 
contention that the low dividend payouts which we observe in intermediate disclosure regimes are the 
result of poorly-protected creditors placing large restrictions on dividend payouts in these regimes.    
The differing reactions of poorly-protected creditors’ in each disclosure regime results in 
different dividend – creditor rights relationships in each, and also different dividend – disclosure 
relationships in weak and strong creditor rights regimes, respectively. The dividend – creditor rights 
relationship is positive in intermediate and high disclosure regimes, yet dividends are much more sensitive 
to creditor rights in the former. The dividend– creditor rights relationship is negative in low disclosure 
regimes. In opaque disclosure regimes, creditors do not restrict dividend payouts given weak legal 
standing. Rather, dividend payouts are larger under weak creditor rights giving rise to a negative 
dividend– creditor rights relationship.     
The dividend – disclosure relationship is “u-shaped” but only under weak creditor rights; 
dividends are large in opaque and transparent regimes, yet much lower in intermediate disclosure regimes. 
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Where creditor rights are strong the dividend – disclosure relationship is positive as dividend payouts 
increase with disclosure standards. Where creditor rights are strong, dividend payouts are much larger in 
intermediate disclosure regimes. Finally, dividend payouts are the largest in high disclosure regimes where 
creditor rights are strong.   
In the next section we examine if these same relations persist once we control for firm- and 
country-level determinants of corporate dividend payouts. 
 
The “dividend payout – creditor rights” relation in each disclosure regime  
In Table 3 we estimate the dividend – creditor rights relationship in each disclosure regime. The 
top panel uses the creditor rights index. The bottom panel uses a low creditor rights dummy which is one 
if the country-level creditor right score is at or below the sample median of 2. The analysis presented in 
Table 3 largely confirms what we found in Figure 1. First, the dividend – creditor rights relationship is 
positive in high and intermediate disclosure regimes, yet the relationship is much more pronounced in 
intermediate disclosure regimes. For example, using dividends-to-cash flow the coefficient estimate on 
the creditor rights index is 0.051*** in medium disclosure regimes yet only 0.018*** in high disclosure 
environments. The different dividend-creditor rights relationships come about because poorly-protected 
creditors place many (few) restrictions on dividend payouts in intermediate (high) disclosure regimes. 
Shao et al. (2013) examine the dividend-creditor rights relationship in strong and weak shareholder rights 
regimes. They show that dividend payouts are most sensitive to creditor rights where shareholder rights 
are strong. Creditors accept large dividends under strong creditor and strong shareholder rights yet 
restrict dividends where creditor rights are weak yet shareholder rights strong. Where shareholder rights 
are weak, well-protected creditors do not mandate large dividend payouts given the norm of low dividend 
payouts under weak shareholder rights. In this paper, we find that dividend payouts are much less 
sensitive to creditor rights in strong disclosure regimes because creditors place fewer restrictions on 
dividend payouts in these regimes. The dividend-creditor rights relationship is at its strongest in 
intermediate disclosure regimes.         
Second, dividend payouts and creditor rights are negatively related in opaque regimes. Using the 
“Low creditor rights dummy” the same patterns in dividends payouts emerge; dividend payouts are 
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smaller where creditor rights are weak in medium and high disclosure regimes, yet larger in opaque 
regimes.13   
In Figure 2 (see Panel B) we depict the predicted relationship between dividend payout and 
creditor rights in each disclosure regime using the estimated coefficient estimates in Table 3. The 
independent variables are evaluated at their sample means and the fixed effects evaluated for industrial 
firms in the year 2005. Our findings possess economic as well as statistical significance. In opaque regimes 
average dividends-to-earnings is 22.9% under weak creditor rights and 17.7% where creditor rights are 
strong. In transparent disclosure regimes poorly-protected creditors place fewer restrictions on dividend 
payouts; using dividends-to-earnings, the difference in dividend payouts is zero. In medium disclosure 
regimes, poorly-protected creditors place the largest restrictions on dividend payout; average dividends-
to-cash flow is 19.5% under strong creditor rights, yet only 8.7% under weak creditor rights, which 
suggests a 2.24 fold (i.e., 19.5/8.7) increase in dividend payouts when creditor rights changes from weak 
to strong. Using dividends-to-sales, Brockman and Unlu (2009) find that dividends are 1.82 times larger 
under strong creditor rights compared to weak creditor rights (i.e., 1.64/0.90).14 Our findings say that 
dividend payouts are most sensitive to creditor rights in intermediate disclosure regimes.   
Finally, across disclosure regimes, the firm- and country-level determinants of corporate dividend 
payouts are almost always signed “correctly” and consistently signed the same. Using dividends-to-cash 
flow, size, growth, leverage, profitability, and growth opportunities are signed the same in each disclosure 
regime. However, their economic significance differs across regimes; dividend payouts are most sensitive 
to size in high disclosure regimes, yet most sensitive to growth, leverage, and profitability in opaque 
regimes. In medium disclosure regimes, dividend payouts are less sensitive to measures of growth, 
leverage, profitability, growth opportunities, and the dividend premium, when compared to dividend 
payouts in the other two disclosure regimes. The relationship between dividend payout and uncertainty 
avoidance is negative in high and medium disclosure regimes. Finally, it is only in high disclosure regimes 
                                                 
13 Shao et al. (2013) find that the dividend payout - creditor rights relationship is much less pronounced and 
sometimes negative under weak shareholder rights.      
14 Brockman and Unlu (2009) present the predicted dividend-to-sales ratio by creditor rights score. The average of 
the predicted dividend-to-sales in weak creditor rights regimes is 0.90% (an average of 0.78% (where CR is 1) and 
1.02% (where CR is 2)) and 1.64% where creditor rights are strong (1.31% (CR is 3), 1.63% (CR is 4), and 1.98% 
where CR is 5).   
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that the estimated coefficient estimate on the dividend premium variable is positive. In opaque regimes, 
the estimated coefficient is negative.    
 
The “dividend payout – disclosure” relation by strength of creditor rights 
In Table 4 we show that our findings in Table 3 have important implications for the dividend – 
disclosure relationship. Here we estimate equation 1 but now by strength of creditor rights. The dividend-
disclosure relation is “u-shaped”, but only where creditor rights are weak. Using dividends-to-cash flow 
the coefficient estimate for “Medium disclosure” is negative (-0.103***), and effectively zero for the 
“High disclosure” regime. The “u-shaped” dividend-disclosure relationship says that the outcome and 
substitution models are not mutually-exclusive; the substitution model is evident in opaque regimes, the 
outcome model manifests in transparent disclosure regimes. So too does the dividend-disclosure 
relationship under strong creditor rights. Where creditor rights are strong the dividend payout-disclosure 
relationship is positive; the coefficient estimates on the medium and high disclosure dummies are 
positive, larger in the high disclosure regime, and always statistically significant. Dividend payouts increase 
monotonically with disclosure quality.  The positive dividend-disclosure relationship, which is evidence in 
support of the “outcome” model, does not automatically rule against the “substitution” model. Rather, it 
says that dividend payouts are an “outcome” of disclosure standards; dividend payouts increase as 
disclosure standards improve, yet dividend payouts remain sufficiently large in opaque regimes so that 
firms can use dividend payouts to build reputation capital. Under strong and weak creditor rights, 
dividend payouts are always larger in transparent regimes. The “outcome” and “substitution” models are 
not mutually-exclusive, and the collective findings from Tables 3 and 4 say that both models hold 
regardless of the strength of creditor rights. Shao et al. (2013) show that the dividend-creditor rights 
relationship is positive, and negative under weak shareholder rights. Our findings are consistent with 
theirs if firms in weak shareholder rights regimes use dividend payouts to build trust with outside 
investors.  
In Figure 2 (see Panel A) we outline the predicted relationship between dividend payout and 
disclosure by strength of creditor rights as implied by the estimated coefficients in Table 4. It is clear from 
Figure 2 that the relationship between dividend payouts and disclosure standards is “u-shaped” under 
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weak creditor rights alone, yet positive under strong creditor rights. In intermediate disclosure regimes, 
dividend payouts under strong creditor rights are more than double dividends paid under weak creditor 
rights (i.e., compare 19.8% under strong creditor rights to 8.7% under weak creditor rights). In opaque 
disclosure regimes firms’ pay out on average 26% more of their cash flow (compare 0.096 under strong 
creditor rights to 0.121 under weak creditor rights) in the form of a dividend under weak creditor rights 
when compared to similar firms in countries where creditor rights are strong. In transparent regimes, 
dividend payouts are not very different under strong and weak creditor rights.  
Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) test the shareholder rights version of the 
outcome model under strong and weak creditor rights. Both find that poorly-protected creditors place 
restrictions on dividend payouts even where shareholder rights are strong. In this paper we find that 
dividend payouts are lower in in transparent regimes under weak creditor rights, yet the extent of 
dividend restrictions is much lower in transparent regimes under weak creditor rights than they are where 
shareholder rights are strong. Our findings say that disclosure standards, and not shareholder rights, serve 
to moderate the dividend-creditor rights relationship.    
In summary Tables 3 and 4 together say that; the substitution model of dividends holds under 
strong and weak creditor rights; poorly-protected creditors place few restrictions on dividend payouts in 
transparent regimes; yet place much larger restrictions on dividend payouts in intermediate disclosure 
regimes. The “u-shaped” dividend-disclosure relationship uncovered by Brockman and Unlu (2011) is 
evident only under weak creditor rights. Otherwise, the relationship is positive.  
In Table 5 we turn our attention towards the propensity to pay a dividend by presenting a series 
of marginal effects from pooled logit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary indicator which is 1 
if the firm pays a dividend in a given year and zero otherwise. When we use dividend payer instead of the 
dividend amount ratios, we still conclude the same as we did in Tables 3 and 4. The relationship between 
the likelihood of paying a dividend and disclosure remains “u-shaped” under weak creditor rights, yet 
mostly positive under strong creditor rights. The relation between the dividend payer and creditor rights 
is positive in intermediate disclosure regimes, negative in opaque regimes, and effectively zero in 
transparent regimes. Interestingly, using dividend payer, dividend payout is now most sensitive to creditor 
rights in opaque regimes.     
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Our findings thus far appear to highlight three distinct substitution effects. First, creditors 
substitute weak legal standing with low dividends to a much greater extent in intermediate disclosure 
regimes. In transparent disclosure regimes dividend payouts are not always lower given weak creditor 
rights. In turn, this latter finding highlights a second distinct substitution effect; rich disclosures appear to 
moderate the dividend – creditor rights relationship. Rich disclosures reduce the agency costs of debt 
which further appears to reduce the need for creditors to restrict dividends given weak creditor rights. In 
this regard, disclosure quality appears to substitute for poor creditor rights. Finally, in opaque regimes 
large dividend payouts appear to substitute for weak creditor rights and/or weak disclosure. We posit that 
this substitution effect is practiced by firms and creditors alike. Firms are financially-constrained in 
opaque regimes, and pay large dividends to relax these constraints by building trust with investors (see 
Gan et al., 2014). Our findings also suggest that creditors do not restrict large dividend payouts which 
suggest that reputation building may be effective in building trust with creditors. For whatever reason(s), 
creditors do not appear to restrict large dividends in opaque regimes.  
In the next section, we study the behaviour of firms and creditors alike in opaque regimes in 
more detail. If poorly-protected creditors exhibit a preference for large dividends in opaque regimes, then 
dividends should remain large and unrestricted in growth and mature firms alike. An alternative view is 
that creditors restrict large dividends in mature firms who have little need to use large dividend payouts to 
build trust, yet continue to allow growth firms to pay large dividends. Also, we try to uncover the 
motivations for firms in opaque regimes to pay even larger dividends where creditor rights are weak. We 
believe that these firms are most financially constrained of all firms in our sample and the large dividends 
that they pay are commensurate with the severity of the financing constraints that they face.  
 
Why do firms pay large dividends in opaque disclosure regimes? 
In Table 6 we present the average dividend payout for firms classified by growth opportunities in 
each disclosure regime. Growth opportunities are captured using the previous three years market-to-book 
of assets. We classify firms into growth deciles, where decile one contains firms with the least growth 
opportunities (e.g., mature firms) and decile ten contains firms with abundant growth opportunities (i.e., 
growth firms). It is clear that in opaque regimes poorly-protected creditors do not restrict dividend 
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payouts in mature firms. Rather, dividend payouts are always larger all across the growth spectrum where 
creditor rights weak when compared to dividend payouts in the same disclosure regime where creditor 
rights are strong.15 The fact that we observe that both growth and mature firms pay large dividends in 
opaque regimes lends support to the view that creditors view large dividend payouts as beneficial to their 
own interests. There does not appear to be any other reason to allow mature firms to pay large dividends 
given weak creditor rights, since it is unlikely that these firms are paying large dividends to build trust with 
investors in the first instance.  
Next we examine whether the large dividend payouts that we observe in opaque regimes reflect 
the severity of the financing constraints that these firms likely face. A priori, constrained firms are the 
most-likely firms to use dividends to build “reputation capital”, especially if other bonding mechanisms, 
say improved governance, may be too expensive for these firms to implement in the first instance (see 
Doidge et al., 2007). Also, dividends paid may increase with the severity of financing constraints, which 
may explain why dividend payouts are largest in opaque regimes where creditor rights are weak. We adopt 
two approaches to capture firm-level financing constraints. First, we explore the financing choices of 
firms by estimating leverage-creditor rights regressions in each disclosure regime. Where disclosure 
standards and creditor rights are weak, one might expect that firms’ use of debt and equity capital be 
constrained. Our second approach is to quantify the severity of financing constraints at the firm-level in 
each disclosure regime using the “constrained” growth rates of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).  
In Table 7 we estimate a series of leverage-creditor rights regressions in each disclosure regime. 
Cho et al. (2014) estimate leverage – creditor rights regressions and find in favour of the demand-side 
view i.e., strong creditor rights has a negative effect on firms’ use of debt finance. Where creditor rights 
are (too) strong, firms voluntarily choose to use more equity, and less debt, so that control can be 
maintained in times of financial distress. Presumably, this substitution away from debt to equity financing 
is made possible where the cost of equity financing is not prohibitively high. The opposite view, the 
supply-side view, says that the leverage-creditor rights relationship is positive. Firms benefit from cheap 
debt capital where creditor rights are strong, but must pay more for debt financing where creditor rights 
are weak. We estimate separate leverage-creditor rights regressions in each disclosure regime, using book 
                                                 
15 In intermediate and transparent disclosure regimes the opposite is the case, as across the growth spectrum 
dividend payouts are always lower where creditor rights are weak.  
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debt (total debt to book assets), long-term debt to assets, and equity to long-term capital (where long-
term capital is the sum of equity and long-term debt), as our leverage/financing variables of choice. 
Interestingly, we find in favour of the demand-side view in medium and high disclosure regimes, yet the 
supply-side view prevails in low disclosure regimes. The estimated coefficients on the debt and long-term 
debt variables are negative in medium and high disclosure regimes, yet positive in low disclosure regimes. 
In medium and high disclosure regimes, as creditor rights improve, equity as proportion of long-term 
capital increases, as firms substitute away from risky debt financing towards safe equity financing. We 
argue that in medium and high disclosure regimes, substituting debt for equity is feasible, since disclosure 
levels are sufficiently large enough so that the cost of equity capital is not prohibitively high making equity 
a viable alternative to debt financing. In low disclosure regimes, as creditor rights improve, equity as 
proportion of long-term capital decreases. Where disclosure quality is low, the cost of equity capital is 
high, which may leave debt finance as the only viable source of capital for firms. Presumably, for many 
firms, substituting debt for equity is not feasible. Thus, our leverage-creditor rights regressions suggest 
that in opaque regimes, firms rely mostly on short-term debt financing where creditor rights are weak, and 
debt finance predominantly (short- and long-term debt), where creditor rights are strong. Reputation 
building would appear to be practiced by firms in opaque regimes so that they can attain better access to 
long-term funding (long-term debt and equity).16  
In Table 8 we try and quantify the severity of financing constraints at the firm-level in each 
disclosure regime. We calculate the proportion of firms in each regime whose actual growth rate exceeds 
their internally-financed growth rate (IG), their short-term financed growth rate (SFG), and their 
maximum sustainable growth rate (SG), respectively (see Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). These 
three growth rates are measures of a firms “constrained growth”. Financially-unconstrained firms can 
grow at a rate greater than their constrained growth rate. As expected, it is firms in opaque regimes where 
creditor rights are weak that are the most constrained of all firms in our sample since we observe that the 
                                                 
16 In the remaining rows of Table 7 we report the average financing ratios for growth and mature firms in each 
disclosure regime. These summary measures would appear to suggest that reputation building is effective, in that 
growth firms in opaque regimes use roughly the same amount of long-term financing (debt and equity) when 
compared to firms in medium and high disclosure regimes. Also, in opaque regimes, growth firms where creditor 
rights are weak use more long-term debt (although the differences are not statistically significant), and the same 
amount of equity to long-term capital compared to the same firms where creditor rights are strong. Firms have 
better access to equity financing as a result of reputation building using large dividend payouts (see Gan et al., 2014).  
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proportion of firms which exceed their constrained rate is lowest here. Since we know that country-level 
institutional factors can partly explain firm-level financing constraints, it is plausible that a combination of 
weak disclosure and poor creditor rights, contribute to firm-level financing obstacles in these regimes (see 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; and Beck et al., 2006). The large dividend payouts which we 
observe in these regimes likely represent the attempts on the part of these firms to overcome severe 
financing constraints by paying the largest dividends of all firms in opaque regimes. If this is the case, and 
there is evidence to say that this bonding approach is successful, poorly-protected creditors do not restrict 
the practice by firms of using large dividend payouts to build trust with outside investors.    
 
Robustness tests 
In Table 9 we show that our findings are robust to a number of additional tests. Panel A says that 
our findings are robust to the use of dividends-to-assets and dividends-to-sales in place of dividends-to-
cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, and dividend-payer to measure corporate dividend payouts. In Panel B, 
we present coefficient estimates from a series of Tobit regressions which accounts for the censored 
nature of our dividend payout variable.17 Accounting for the censored nature of corporate dividend 
payout fails to materially affect our main conclusions. Next, a potential criticism is that our findings are 
biased because of omitted country-level variables, which are correlated with creditor rights, disclosure, 
and dividend payouts. In Panel C we include a number of additional country-level determinants of 
dividend payouts. These measures are dividend tax advantage, the revised anti-director rights index, stock 
market development, and labor rights. We find that our conclusions remain unaltered when we include 
these additional variables either individually in turn, or collectively. In Panel D we exclude all firms from 
Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Collectively these countries contribute more than half (53.66%) of the total 
number of firms in our sample. A potential concern then is that our findings are driven by the inclusion 
of firms from these countries. By and large, they are not.18 However, when we exclude firms from the 
U.K., dividends paid under weak creditor rights in transparent regimes are now lower.   
                                                 
17 In a series of unreported regressions, we show that our Tobit regressions are robust to the use of dividends-to-
earnings, dividends-to-sales and dividends-to-assets as the payout measure.    
18 Using dividends-to-earnings for the reduced sample under strong creditor rights the disclosure coefficient is 
negative (-0.125***) and the disclosure squared term is positive (0.001***) indicating a u-shaped relationship 
between dividend payout and disclosure standards. However, a u-shaped relationship between dividend payouts and 
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4. Concluding remarks 
In the beginning of this paper we pose three questions. To answer each of these questions we 
observe the actions of poorly-protected creditors in various disclosure regimes. First, we examine whether 
creditors restrict the practice by firms in opaque regimes of using large dividend payouts to build 
reputation capital? Second, are the low dividend payouts which we observe in intermediate disclosure 
regimes the result of creditors in Canada and the U.S., two countries where creditor rights are weak, 
placing large restrictions on dividend payouts? And finally, we explore whether creditors continue to 
restrict dividend payouts in transparent regimes where disclosures are abundant, and agency costs of debt 
low? We are able to answer these three questions by showing that the extent to which creditors influence 
corporate dividend policy is influenced by the quality of the disclosure environment. 
Using a sample of 124,849 firm-years from 28 countries we show that the dividend-creditor 
rights relationship is strongly influenced by disclosure standards and the dividend-disclosure relationship 
by the strength of creditor rights. A priori, if creditors place many (few) restrictions on corporate dividend 
payouts, then dividend payouts will be sensitive (less sensitive) to creditor rights resulting in a “strong” 
(“weak”) dividend-creditor rights relationship. The dividend-creditor rights relationship is positive in 
medium and high transparency regimes. The relationship is stronger in the former regime, as it is here 
where creditors place the largest restrictions on corporate dividend payouts. The low dividends that 
Brockman and Unlu (2011) observe in intermediate disclosure regimes is a direct result of poorly-
protected creditors in Canada and the United States placing large restrictions on dividend payouts We 
observe that dividend payouts are much larger in intermediate disclosure regimes where creditor rights are 
strong.   
In high disclosure regimes, poorly- protected creditors place fewer restrictions on dividend 
payout. In effect they appear to view weak creditor rights (and the associated high agency costs of debt) 
and a healthy disclosure environment (and its associated low agency costs of debt) as substitutes for one 
                                                                                                                                                        
disclosure standards is not evidence against our hypotheses per se as the u-shaped relation which we observe here is 
much less pronounced as is the case where creditor rights are weak as dividend payouts in intermediate disclosure 
regimes remain large. Specifically, the predicted dividends-to-earnings by disclosure standards are as follows: where 
disclosure is 62 the predicted dividends to earnings ratio is 25%. The predicted payouts for the remaining disclosure 
levels are: 67 (payout is 21%), 68 (18%), 73 (18%), 74 (27%), 75 (23%), 79 (25%), and 80 (26%). For our reduced 
sample, dividend payouts remain large in all three disclosure regimes. In intermediate disclosure regimes dividend 
payouts are much smaller under weak creditor rights. When we replace disclosure and its square with the disclosure 
dummies the “dividend payout-disclosure” relation is positive.       
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another. Finally we show that the dividend-creditor rights relationship is negative in opaque regimes. 
Rather than restrict dividends in opaque regimes, dividend payouts remain large irrespective of the 
strength of creditor rights. We do not know whether large dividends in opaque regimes are (a) accepted 
by poorly-protected creditors because trust has been built between them and the firm and/or (b) 
demanded by creditors to compensate for weak disclosure (and weak creditor rights). Whatever the 
reason(s), firms can use large dividends to build trust with outside investors in opaque regimes even 
where creditor rights are weak.   
Our findings also have important implications for the dividend-disclosure relationship. The 
agency models of dividends offer two alternative dividend-disclosure relationships. The first model, the 
“outcome” model, says that dividend payout increases with disclosure quality. The second model, the 
“substitution” model, says that dividend payout decreases with disclosure quality. However, Brockman 
and Unlu (2011) show that the outcome and substitution models are not mutually-exclusive, and a finding 
in favour of one does not automatically rule against the other. They proceed to show that the actual 
dividend-disclosure relationship is neither positive nor negative, but “u-shaped”. We show that the nature 
of the dividend-disclosure relationship is influenced by the strength of creditor rights.  It is only under 
weak creditor rights that we observe a “u-shaped” dividend payout-disclosure relationship. In contrast, 
where creditor rights are strong the dividend-disclosure relationship is positive; dividend payouts increase 
monotonically with disclosure quality. However, and like Brockman and Unlu (2011), we do move in 
favour of the “outcome” model and against the “substitution” model. Rather, our findings say that 
dividends remain large in opaque regimes (the substitution model), yet larger in intermediate (the 
outcome model) and strong disclosure environments (also the outcome model) where strongly-protected 
creditors place few restrictions on dividend payouts. Dividend payouts are always the largest in 
transparent regimes, yet are sufficiently large enough in opaque regimes to allow firms to use dividend 
payouts to build trust with outside investors. The outcome and substitution models are not mutually 
exclusive and prevail under strong and weak creditor rights.   
Our analysis highlight a number of issues which we believe are worthy of future research. One of 
the most interesting relates to the reputation building practices of firms in opaque regimes. Firms use 
more equity financing once trust has been established with outside investors (see Gan et al., 2014). Gan et 
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al. (2014) do not explore the debt issuing behaviour of these firms. It would be interesting to examine 
whether creditors extend more long-term debt finance to reputation-building firms. Poorly-protected 
creditors do not restrict the practice of reputation-building by firms, yet it is not clear if the firms have 
greater access to long-term equity and debt financing once this trust has been established. We present 
some summary financing measures at the bottom of Table 8 which suggests that these firms appear to 
have access to more long-term debt financing. However, further work is required so that the relationship 
between dividend payout, reputation-building, and debt financing in opaque disclosure regimes is better 
understood. Finally, in this paper we do not explore how culture may moderate the dividend-creditor 
rights and dividend-disclosure relationships. Byrne and O’Connor (2017) show that culture (e.g., 
collectivism) moderates the dividend-creditor rights relationship; in collectivist societies, dividend payouts 
are actually larger under weak creditor rights. In this paper, many collectivist countries belong in low 
disclosure/weak creditor rights regimes (see Argentina, India, Japan, and Mexico for example). Therefore, 
it possible that culture may also help to explain why poorly-protected creditors do not restrict dividend 
payouts in opaque disclosure regimes.  
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Table 1 
Sample description 
This table reports the final sample by country. Average dividend payout is reported for each country. Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow (Div-CF), dividends-to-earnings (Div-E), 
dividends-to-assets (Div-A), and dividends-to-net sales (Div-S), as indicated. Payout data is sourced from Worldscope. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La 
Porta et al (1998), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Disclosure is a country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges from 0 to 100, where higher values correspond to more disclosures. Rank denotes high, medium, or low disclosure. We use uncertainty avoidance 
(UA) to capture cultural influences on dividend payout. DTA is dividend tax advantage, SMD is stock market development, “Div Prem” is dividend premium, and Rev ADR is the (revised) 
anti-director rights index. All country-level variables are defined in appendix 1.      
 Sample Dividend payout measures Creditor 
rights 
Disclosure Culture Additional country-level variables 
 # Obs # Firms Div-CF Div-E Div-A Div-S Score Rank UA DTA SMD Div 
Prem 
Rev 
ADR 
Labor 
Rights 
Argentina 324 47 0.07 0.12 0.015 0.013 1 68 Low 86 1.000 38.58 1.24 2 0.344 
Australia 4,486 778 0.19 0.28 0.021 0.017 3 80 High 51 0.837 110.06 0.95 4 0.352 
Austria 406 54 0.13 0.28 0.014 0.013 3 62 Low 70 0.750 23.30 0.79 2.5 0.501 
Belgium 566 81 0.12 0.25 0.017 0.015 2 68 Low 94 0.850 68.27 0.95 3.0 0.513 
Canada 5286 828 0.05 0.08 0.010 0.006 1 75 Medium 48 0.791 107.40 0.81 4 0.262 
Denmark 838 101 0.12 0.21 0.013 0.010 3 75 Medium 23 0.639 57.90 0.90 4 0.573 
Finland 563 88 0.23 0.39 0.027 0.020 1 83 High 59 1.078 130.08 1.06 3.5 0.737 
France 3,957 590 0.12 0.22 0.012 0.011 0 78 High 86 0.657 79.47 0.99 3.5 0.744 
Germany 4,054 595 0.11 0.22 0.013 0.010 3 67 Low 65 0.728 47.11 1.07 3.5 0.702 
Hong Kong 4,988 739 0.15 0.20 0.017 0.016 4 73 Medium 29 1.000 339.12 0.83 5 0.170 
India 3,597 510 0.16 0.23 0.020 0.019 2 61 Low 40 0.744 47.40 1.49 5 0.443 
Ireland 394 46 0.14 0.19 0.012 0.011 1 81 High 35 0.611 59.74 0.75 5 0.343 
Italy 1,259 176 0.12 0.26 0.013 0.015 2 66 Low 75 0.873 44.62 1.07 2 0.650 
Japan 24,276 3,333 0.12 0.26 0.010 0.007 1 71 Low 92 0.580 78.06 0.92 4.5 0.164 
Korea 5,031 783 0.08 0.16 0.010 0.008 3 68 Low 85 0.690 55.46 0.82 4.5 0.446 
Malaysia 4,846 748 0.13 0.20 0.012 0.015 3 79 High 36 1.000 141.56 0.96 5 0.189 
Mexico 713 96 0.08 0.14 0.011 0.011 0 71 Low 82 1.000 23.41 1.24 3 0.594 
Netherlands 1,141 136 0.18 0.30 0.016 0.011 3 74 Medium 53 0.700 113.96 0.82 2.5 0.726 
Norway 799 120 0.11 0.18 0.014 0.013 2 75 Medium 50 1.075 44.73 0.89 3.5 0.685 
New Zealand 479 72 0.32 0.48 0.039 0.028 4 85 High 49 1.009 39.54 1.07 4 0.161 
Singapore 3,223 516 0.17 0.24 0.016 0.016 3 79 High 8 0.971 185.63 0.94 5 0.312 
Spain 795 101 0.16 0.28 0.021 0.018 2 72 Medium 86 0.851 71.37 0.94 5 0.745 
Sweden 1,491 239 0.17 0.24 0.019 0.014 1 83 High 29 0.757 104.83 0.87 3.5 0.741 
Switzerland 1,454 174 0.13 0.24 0.014 0.014 1 80 High 58 0.585 229.64 1.04 3 0.452 
Thailand 2,535 347 0.18 0.28 0.023 0.020 2 66 Low 64 1.029 51.56 0.99 4 0.410 
Turkey 920 165 0.11 0.19 0.016 0.012 2 58 Low 85 0.617 22.40 1.13 3 0.403 
Utd Kingdom 9,702 1,369 0.16 0.25 0.018 0.015 4 85 High 35 0.857 141.99 0.82 5 0.282 
United States 36,726 4,712 0.04 0.06 0.005 0.004 1 76 Medium 46 0.703 135.07 0.85 3 0.218 
 124,849 17,544              
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Table 2 
Dividend payout, creditor rights and disclosure quality 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions with t-stats adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level presented underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is 1996-2007. The dependent 
variable is either dividends-to-cash flow or dividends-to-earnings, as indicated. Creditor rights are an index 
aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (1998), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong 
creditor rights). Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). Disclosure is a country-level accounting 
disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges from 0 to 
100, where higher values correspond to more disclosures. In the top panel, “Disclosure” and “Disclosure2” are 
included in each regression. In the bottom panel, we create separate dummy variables for each disclosure regime, 
where the reference group is the “Low disclosure” regime. Uncertainty avoidance measures culture and is sourced 
from Hofstede (2001). All other variables are defined in the main text and summarized in appendix 1. A full set of 
year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable is 
 Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings 
Creditor rights 0.028*** 
(29.20) 
 0.031*** 
(26.19) 
0.031*** 
(22.73) 
 0.046*** 
(28.36) 
Disclosure  -0.086*** 
(24.90) 
-0.021*** 
(4.99) 
 -0.112*** 
(22.06) 
-0.034*** 
(5.73) 
Disclosure2  0.001*** 
(25.00) 
0.001*** 
(5.63) 
 0.001*** 
(21.65) 
0.001*** 
(6.55) 
       
Size   0.013*** 
(26.99) 
  0.025*** 
(36.84) 
Growth   -0.016*** 
(15.11) 
  -0.020*** 
(13.82) 
Leverage   -0.078*** 
(27.91) 
  -0.089*** 
(20.92) 
Profitability   0.031*** 
(17.43) 
  0.027*** 
(11.52) 
Tobin’s q   0.010*** 
(9.43) 
  -0.001 
(0.41) 
Uncertainty avoidance   0.001*** 
(14.59) 
  0.002*** 
(30.79) 
Dividend premium   0.104*** 
(17.15) 
  0.157*** 
(17.72) 
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# firm-year observations 124,849 124,849 124,849 124,849 124,849 124,849 
R-squared 0.053 0.040 0.147 0.032 0.030 0.172 
 Dependent variable is 
 Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings 
Medium disclosure dummy 
 
 -0.061*** 
(30.82) 
-0.041*** 
(8.29) 
 -0.150*** 
(48.62) 
-0.086*** 
(12.48) 
High disclosure dummy 
 
0.042*** 
(15.01) 
0.032*** 
(7.60) 
0.010* 
(1.85) 
0.034*** 
(5.68) 
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Average div in low disclosure 0.12 0.24 
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Table 3 
Dividend payout and creditor rights by disclosure quality 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions with t-stats adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level presented underneath in parenthesis. Separate regressions are estimated by level of 
disclosure quality. Disclosure is a country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The sample period is 1996-2007. The dependent variable is either 
dividends-to-cash flow or dividends-to-earnings, as indicated. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor 
rights, following La Porta et al. (1998), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). In the top panel, the creditor rights index is 
employed to measure creditor rights. In the bottom panel, the creditor rights index is replaced with a “Low 
creditor rights dummy” variable which is one if creditor rights are less than or equal to the sample median (2) 
and zero otherwise. Uncertainty avoidance is a country-level culture measure from Hofstede (2001). All other 
variables are defined in the main text and summarized in appendix 1. A full set of year and industry fixed effects 
are included but not reported, and ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Dependent variable is 
 Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings 
 Disclosure levels 
 High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Creditor rights 0.018*** 
(7.84) 
0.051*** 
(22.00) 
-0.020*** 
(11.05) 
0.028*** 
(8.90) 
0.069*** 
(22.25) 
-0.034*** 
(11.03) 
       
Size 0.025*** 
(23.08) 
0.014*** 
(21.59) 
0.002*** 
(2.98) 
0.042*** 
(27.84) 
0.024*** 
(26.39) 
0.015*** 
(12.05) 
Growth -0.025*** 
(10.20) 
-0.011*** 
(10.79) 
-0.033*** 
(9.87) 
-0.027*** 
(8.44) 
-0.017*** 
(12.31) 
-0.030*** 
(6.18) 
Leverage -0.123*** 
(14.60) 
-0.021*** 
(7.91) 
-0.179*** 
(37.06) 
-0.131*** 
(11.42) 
-0.019*** 
(4.72) 
-0.245*** 
(28.12) 
Profitability 0.101*** 
(17.23) 
0.004*** 
(2.94) 
0.156*** 
(13.89) 
0.127*** 
(16.76) 
-0.001 
(0.16) 
0.174*** 
(12.49) 
Tobin’s q 0.019*** 
(9.80) 
0.010*** 
(7.11) 
0.010** 
(2.38) 
0.014*** 
(5.67) 
0.010*** 
(3.79) 
-0.021*** 
(8.09) 
Uncertainty avoidance -0.001 
(0.38) 
0.002*** 
(6.06) 
-0.002*** 
(14.23) 
0.001*** 
(3.04) 
0.003*** 
(8.14) 
-0.002*** 
(9.51) 
Dividend premium 0.087*** 
(5.36) 
-0.011 
(0.81) 
-0.057*** 
(6.99) 
0.114*** 
(5.48) 
-0.022 
(1.20) 
-0.108*** 
(8.02) 
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# firm-year observations 30,595 50,573 43,681 30,595 50,573 43,681 
R-squared 0.178 0.198 0.148 0.189 0.203 0.104 
 Dependent variable is 
 Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings 
 Disclosure levels 
 High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Low creditor rights dummy -0.059*** 
(8.65) 
-0.145*** 
(21.24) 
0.046*** 
(14.23) 
-0.079*** 
(8.53) 
-0.204*** 
(22.31) 
0.074*** 
(13.63) 
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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Table 4 
Dividend payout and disclosure quality by strength of creditor rights 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions with t-stats adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level presented underneath in parenthesis. Separate regressions are estimated by level of 
creditor rights. Firms belong in high (low) creditor rights regimes if their country level score is above (below and 
equal to) the country sample median, which is 2. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, 
following La Porta et al. (1998), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Creditor 
rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). The sample period is 1996-2007. The dependent variable is 
either dividends-to-cash flow or dividends-to-earnings, as indicated. Disclosure is a country-level accounting 
disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges from 0 
to 100, where higher values correspond to more disclosures. Uncertainty Avoidance is a country-level culture 
measure from Hofstede (2001). In the top panel, “Disclosure” and “Disclosure2” are included in each regression. 
In the bottom panel, we create separate dummy variables for each disclosure regime, namely, low, medium, and 
high disclosure. The reference group is the low disclosure regime. All other variables are defined in the main text 
and summarized in appendix 1. A full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and 
***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable is 
 Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings 
 Strength of creditor rights (CR) 
 High CR Low CR High CR Low CR 
Disclosure 0.085*** 
(8.78) 
-0.111*** 
(14.42) 
0.068*** 
(4.83) 
-0.150*** 
(13.07) 
Disclosure2 -0.001*** 
(8.45) 
0.001*** 
(14.22) 
-0.004*** 
(4.47) 
0.001*** 
(12.95) 
     
Size 0.026*** 
(23.96) 
0.010*** 
(17.51) 
0.041*** 
(29.25) 
0.021*** 
(25.83) 
Growth -0.020*** 
(9.72) 
-0.018*** 
(16.08) 
-0.019*** 
(6.95) 
-0.026*** 
(16.46) 
Leverage -0.138*** 
(20.04) 
-0.069*** 
(25.36) 
-0.158*** 
(16.73) 
-0.079*** 
(17.88) 
Profitability 0.088*** 
(17.95) 
0.013*** 
(8.89) 
0.111*** 
(17.55) 
0.001 
(0.59) 
Tobin’s q 0.020*** 
(10.75) 
0.010*** 
(6.61) 
0.015*** 
(6.52) 
-0.003** 
(2.21) 
Uncertainty avoidance 0.001 
(0.32) 
0.001*** 
(22.16) 
0.001*** 
(3.06) 
0.003*** 
(33.88) 
Dividend premium 0.052*** 
(4.61) 
0.028*** 
(3.47) 
0.086*** 
(5.50) 
0.051*** 
(4.10) 
Industry  and time dummies Included Included Included Included 
# firm-year observations 39,194 85,655 39,194 85,655 
R-squared  0.187 0.149 0.180 0.206 
 Strength of creditor rights (CR) 
 High CR Low CR High CR Low CR 
Medium disclosure dummy 
 
0.105*** 
(10.38) 
-0.103*** 
(18.30) 
0.099*** 
(7.22) 
-0.162*** 
(20.40) 
High disclosure dummy 
 
0.122*** 
(13.83) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.145*** 
(11.64) 
-0.010 
(1.50) 
Industry  and time dummies Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Average div payout in low disclosure 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.25 
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Table 5 
Dividend payer regressions 
This table reports marginal effects from pooled fixed-effect logit regressions. The marginal effects are evaluated at the 
sample mean of each variable. Separate regressions are estimated by level of creditor rights and disclosure, as indicated. 
Firms belong in high (low) creditor rights regimes if their country level score is above (below or equal to) the country 
sample median, which is 2. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). “Low creditor 
rights dummy” is a dummy variable which is one if creditor rights are less than the sample median (2) and zero 
otherwise. Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). Disclosure is a country-level accounting 
disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges from 0 to 100, 
where higher values correspond to more disclosures. In the bottom panel, we create separate dummy variables for each 
disclosure regime, namely, low, medium, and high disclosure. The reference group is the low disclosure regime. All 
other variables are defined in the main text and summarized in appendix 1. The sample period is 1996-2007. A full set 
of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Creditor rights (CR) Disclosure levels 
 High CR Low CR High Medium Low 
Disclosure 0.043* 
(1.67) 
-0.205*** 
(8.77) 
   
Disclosure2 -0.002 
(1.42) 
0.001*** 
(8.76) 
   
Creditor rights   0.005 
(0.76) 
0.011*** 
(12.19) 
-0.149*** 
(17.45) 
      
Size 0.106*** 
(22.68) 
0.050*** 
(25.41) 
0.105*** 
(19.15) 
0.010*** 
(13.26) 
0.100*** 
(24.01) 
Growth 0.017* 
(1.91) 
-0.053*** 
(9.90) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.010*** 
(9.57) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
Leverage -0.536*** 
(17.50) 
-0.261*** 
(19.31) 
-0.418*** 
(11.51) 
-0.022*** 
(8.75) 
-0.802*** 
(30.58) 
Profitability 3.493*** 
(59.88) 
1.283*** 
(51.12) 
3.760*** 
(55.98) 
0.146*** 
(16.33) 
3.875*** 
(29.99) 
Tobin’s q -0.113*** 
(19.39) 
-0.055*** 
(25.35) 
-0.113*** 
(19.17) 
-0.010*** 
(12.49) 
-0.112*** 
(14.39) 
Uncertainty avoidance -0.001 
(1.14) 
0.005*** 
(25.81) 
-0.001*** 
(3.66) 
0.001*** 
(6.53) 
-0.004*** 
(7.01) 
Dividend premium -0.111*** 
(3.51) 
0.038 
(1.62) 
0.048 
(1.07) 
-0.010*** 
(3.22) 
-0.392*** 
(11.50) 
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
R-squared  0.439 0.429 0.476 0.408 0.362 
 Creditor rights (CR) Disclosure levels 
 High CR Low CR High Medium Low 
Medium disclosure dummy 
 
-0.036 
(1.56) 
-0.273*** 
(21.08) 
   
High disclosure dummy 
 
0.082*** 
(3.82) 
-0.034*** 
(7.34) 
   
Low creditor rights dummy    -0.024 
(1.33) 
-0.117*** 
(9.32) 
0.277*** 
(17.80) 
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
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Table 6 
Financing, creditor rights and disclosure standards 
This table outlines the average dividend payout for firms sorted by growth in countries with different levels of disclosure 
and creditor rights (Panel A), and average book debt, long-term debt to assets, and equity to long-term capital for firms in 
the each disclosure regime (Panels B and C). Market-to-book (M/B) decile is rank decile for market-to-book of assets 
over the past 3 years. Disclosure is a country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). Firms belong in high (low) creditor rights regimes if their country level score is 
above (below and equal to) the country sample median, which is 2. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor 
rights, following La Porta et al. (1998), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Dividend 
payout is dividends-to-cash flow. ***, **, and * signifies that the differences in mean dividend payouts are statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.        
Panel A: Dividend payouts (dividends-to-cash flow) by growth decile in each disclosure regime 
 
 Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow 
 Low disclosure Medium disclosure High disclosure 
M/B 
decile 
High 
CR 
Low 
CR 
Difference High 
CR 
Low 
CR 
Difference High 
CR 
Low 
CR 
Difference 
1 0.08 0.11 (0.04)*** 0.16 0.03 0.13*** 0.15 0.10 0.04*** 
2 0.08 0.12 (0.05)*** 0.14 0.06 0.08*** 0.14 0.13 0.02*** 
3 0.09 0.13 (0.04)*** 0.14 0.07 0.07*** 0.16 0.12 0.04*** 
4 0.10 0.13 (0.02)*** 0.15 0.06 0.09*** 0.17 0.13 0.05*** 
5 0.11 0.13 (0.02)*** 0.16 0.05 0.10*** 0.17 0.13 0.04*** 
6 0.12 0.13 (0.01)*** 0.15 0.05 0.10*** 0.17 0.15 0.02*** 
7 0.12 0.14 (0.02)*** 0.16 0.04 0.11*** 0.18 0.15 0.03*** 
8 0.14 0.15 (0.01)*** 0.18 0.04 0.14*** 0.17 0.16 0.01*** 
9 0.13 0.16 (0.03)*** 0.17 0.04 0.13*** 0.16 0.18 (0.02)*** 
10 0.15 0.18 (0.04)*** 0.25 0.03 0.22*** 0.18 0.19 (0.01) 
Panel B: Financing in low disclosure regimes 
 
 Book debt Long-term debt to assets Equity to long-term capital 
M/B 
decile 
High 
CR 
Low 
CR 
Difference High 
CR 
Low 
CR 
Difference High 
CR 
Low 
CR 
Difference 
1 0.30 0.28 0.02*** 0.13 0.12 0.01* 0.74 0.75 (0.01) 
2 0.28 0.26 0.02** 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.75 0.76 (0.01) 
3 0.24 0.26 (0.02)* 0.11 0.12 (0.01) 0.76 0.77 (0.01) 
4 0.22 0.25 (0.03)*** 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.77 0.78 (0.01) 
5 0.22 0.24 (0.02)*** 0.11 0.12 (0.01) 0.77 0.78 (0.01) 
6 0.21 0.23 (0.02)*** 0.11 0.12 (0.01) 0.77 0.78 (0.01) 
7 0.20 0.24 (0.04)*** 0.11 0.13 (0.02)*** 0.79 0.77 0.02 
8 0.19 0.23 (0.04)** 0.10 0.13 (0.03) 0.78 0.78 0.00 
9 0.17 0.22 (0.05)** 0.09 0.12 (0.03) 0.80 0.80 0.00 
10 0.17 0.20 (0.03) 0.08 0.10 (0.02) 0.85 0.84 0.01 
Panel C: Financing in low, medium and high disclosure regimes 
 
 Book debt Long-term debt to assets Equity to long-term capital 
 High CR Low CR High CR Low CR High CR Low CR 
Low disclosure: 
High growth 0.20 0.23 0.11 0.12 0.78 0.78 
Low growth 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.76 0.77 
Medium disclosure: 
High growth 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.17 0.83 0.76 
Low growth 0.22 0.27 0.10 0.20 0.84 0.70 
High disclosure: 
High growth 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.83 0.77 
Low growth 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.83 0.73 
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Table 7 
The leverage-creditor rights relationship in each disclosure regime 
The table reports coefficient estimates from pooled least squares regressions with t-stats adjusted for firm-level clustering 
presented underneath in parentheses. Separate regressions are estimated by level of disclosure quality. Disclosure is a country-
level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The sample 
period is 1996-2007. The dependent variable is either book debt, long-term debt to assets (LTD), or common equity to long-
term capital (E/LTC), as indicated. Book debt is total debt to total assets. Long term capital (LTC) is the sum of common equity 
and long-term debt. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (1998), and ranges from 0 
(weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). All other variables 
are defined in the main text. Time and industry dummies are included, but not reported. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, 
**, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Disclosure levels 
 High Medium Low 
 Book 
Debt 
LTD E/LTC Book 
Debt 
LTD E/LTC Book 
Debt 
LTD E/LTC 
Creditor rights -0.010*** 
(5.42) 
-0.010*** 
(6.45) 
0.021*** 
(10.05) 
-0.010** 
(2.55) 
-0.026*** 
(16.99) 
0.035*** 
(17.86) 
0.011*** 
(4.16) 
0.011*** 
(7.31) 
-0.022*** 
(7.24) 
          
CR range 0 to 4 1 to 4 0 to 3 
Ind  dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 30,595 30,595 30,595 50,573 50,573 50,573 43,681 43,681 43,681 
R-squared  0.107 0.151 0.192 0.183 0.111 0.169 0.171 0.183 0.171 
 Predicted leverage by strength of creditor rights 
Lowest CR 0.228 0.136 0.746 0.250 0.180 0.747 0.207 0.103 0.809 
Highest CR 0.198 0.118 0.824 0.215 0.095 0.844 0.255 0.129 0.757 
 
 
Table 8 
Disclosure levels, creditor rights and the proportion of firms which exceed their constrained growth rates  
This table presents the proportion of firms whose actual growth rate exceeds their constrained growth rate. Actual 
growth is measured as one-year annual sales growth. We use three constrained growth rates from Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998), namely IG, SFG, and SG. IG is the maximum growth that a firm can achieve if it relies on 
internal funds alone and maintains it dividend. SFG is the maximum growth rate that a firm can attain by using both 
internal cash-flows and short-term debt. SG is the maximum growth rate achievable using internal funds, short and 
long-term debt to maintain a constant book leverage ratio (i.e. total debt to assets). Low (Medium) disclosure ranges 
from 58 to 71 (72 to 76). High disclosure corresponds to disclosure values between 78 and 85. Firms belong in high 
(low) creditor rights regimes if their country level score is above (below and equal to) the country sample median, 
which is 2. Disclosure is from CIFAR (2005), and creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007).   
 Constrained growth rates 
 Internally-financed growth rate 
(IG) 
Short-term financed growth 
rate (SFG) 
Maximum attainable growth 
rate (SG) 
 Proportion of firms which 
exceed their internally-financed 
growth rate (IG) 
Proportion of firms which 
exceed their short-term 
financed growth rate (SFG) 
Proportion of firms which 
exceed their maximum 
attainable growth rate (SG) 
Disclosure: High CR Low CR High CR Low CR High CR Low CR 
Low  0.54 0.50 0.46 0.40 0.44 0.38 
Medium 0.55 0.57 0.47 0.56 0.39 0.45 
High 0.60 0.57 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.42 
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Table 9 
Robustness tests 
This table reports coefficient estimates from a series of robustness tests. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates from a series of pooled ordinary least squares estimates using dividends-to-
assets and dividends-to-sales, as indicated. In Panel B we account for the censored nature of the dependent variable by estimating a series of tobit regressions. In all regressions, dividends to 
cash flow are used to measure dividend payout. In Panel C we include a number of additional country-level variables in a series of pooled ordinary least squares regressions. Panel D excludes 
firms from Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. In all dividends to cash flow is used to measure dividend payout. Dividend tax advantage is the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends 
divided by the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in capital gains and are values corresponding to the year 2001. Dividend tax advantage is sourced from Bartram et al. (2012) and Fidrmuc 
and Jacob (2010). The (Revised) anti-director rights index is an index capturing the strength of shareholder rights. The index is sourced from Djankov et al. (2008). Stock market development 
is calculated in each year from 1996 to 2007 as stock market capitalization to GDP. This data is sourced from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000). Labor rights are from Botero et al. 
(2004) and capture the strength of labor (employment) rights in each country. A full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.     
 Coefficient estimates for creditor 
rights variable in various disclosure 
regimes 
Coefficient estimates for “low 
creditor rights dummy” in various 
disclosure regimes 
Coefficient estimates 
for “medium disclosure 
dummy” in high and 
low creditor rights 
regimes 
Coefficient estimates 
for “high disclosure 
dummy” in high and 
low creditor rights 
regimes 
 Disclosure levels Creditor rights (CR) 
 High Medium Low High Medium Low High CR Low CR High CR Low CR 
Panel A: Alternative dividend payout variables: 
Dividends-to-assets 0.0002 0.005*** 0.0002 -0.006*** -0.014*** 0.002*** 0.009*** -0.010*** 0.010*** 0.001** 
Dividends-to-sales 0.002*** 0.005*** -0.002** -0.007*** -0.010*** 0.003*** 0.008*** -0.010*** 0.010*** 0.001 
           
Panel B: Censored dependent variable estimation: 
Tobit estimation using dividends-to-cash flow 0.016*** 0.124*** -0.040*** -0.055*** -0.342*** 0.081*** 0.112*** -0.221*** 0.148*** -0.003 
           
Panel C: Additional controls using dividends-to-cash flow: 
Dividend tax advantage 0.018*** 0.051*** -0.018*** -0.059*** -0.145*** 0.044*** 0.106*** -0.101*** 0.124*** 0.004 
(Revised) Anti-director rights index 0.033*** 0.051*** -0.019*** -0.119*** -0.124*** 0.046*** 0.099*** -0.088*** 0.121*** 0.012** 
Stock market development 0.018*** 0.053*** -0.017*** -0.057*** -0.135*** 0.044*** 0.090*** -0.094*** 0.122*** 0.010** 
Labor rights 0.028*** 0.047*** -0.010*** -0.107*** -0.143*** 0.042*** 0.102*** -0.108*** 0.118*** -0.047*** 
           
Panel D: Excl. firms from Japan, the U.K., and the U.S: 
Coefficient estimate using dividends-to-cash flow 0.037** 0.044*** -0.019*** -0.074*** -0.116*** 0.051*** 0.098*** -0.090*** 0.126*** -0.019*** 
Coefficient estimate using dividends-to-earnings 0.049*** 0.057*** -0.014*** -0.091*** -0.163*** 0.059*** 0.092*** -0.130*** 0.147*** -0.020** 
Coefficient estimate using dividend payer 0.011 0.074*** 0.045*** -0.030 -0.236*** 0.031 -0.042 -0.256*** 0.109*** 0.070*** 
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Appendix 1 
Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Source Coverage 
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends per share/cash flow per share Worldscope 1996-2007 
Dividends-to-earnings Dividends per share/earnings per share Worldscope 1996-2007 
Dividends-to-assets Total dividends to total assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Dividends-to-sales Total dividends to net sales Worldscope 1996-2007 
Size Log of book assets in US$ Worldscope 1996-2007 
Growth Logarithmic one-year sales growth Worldscope 1996-2007 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxation to book assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Leverage Total debt to total assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Long-term debt to assets Long-term debt to assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Equity to long-term capital Equity to long-term capital. Long-term capital is the sum of equity and long-term debt   
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of debt less plus market capitalization divided by the 
book value of assets 
Worldscope 1996-2007 
IG (ROA*b)/(1-(ROA*b)), where ROA is return on assets, and b is the retention ratio Worldscope 1996-2007 
SG (ROE/(1 ROE))− where ROE is the return on equity Worldscope 1996-2007 
SFG (ROLTC/(1 ROLTC))− where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings after interest and tax to 
long-term capital. Long-term capital is calculated as the product of a firm’s total assets and 1 
minus the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets 
Worldscope 1996-2007 
Creditor rights  An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (1998).  
The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) 
Djankov, McLeish and 
Shleifer (2007) 
We use creditor rights data for the 
year 2002 
Disclosure  Country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The index is created 
by examining and rating companies’ annual reports for their inclusion and exclusion of 
85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 as the highest standard 
CIFAR (1995) and 
sourced from Hope et 
al. (2007) 
1993 
Uncertainty avoidance Captures the extent of uncertainty avoidance in a society   Hofstede (2001)  
Labour rights Employment laws index from Botero et al. (2004). The employment laws index combines 
four sub-indexes, namely (1) alternative employment contracts, (2) cost of increasing hours 
worked, (3) cost of firing workers, and (4) dismissal procedures    
Botero et al. (2004) 1997 
Stock market development Stock market capitalization to GDP in each year from 1996 to 2007 Updated version of 
Beck et al. (2000) 
1996-2007 
Dividend tax advantage The after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of one 
dollar paid out in capital gains. Dividend tax advantage is for 2001 
Bartram et al. (2012) 
and Fidrmuc and Jacob 
(2010) 
2001 
Shareholder rights Revised version of the original anti-director rights index of La Porta et al. (1998) Djankov et al. (2008) 1997 
Dividend premium The ratio of the average market-to-book of dividend paying firms to the average market-to-
book of non-paying firms. Dividend Premium is calculated annually for each country 
Worldscope 1996-2007 
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Figure 1 
Dividend payout, disclosure standards and the strength of creditor rights 
Panel A: Dividend payout, disclosure standards and the strength of creditor rights 
 
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings 
  
 
 Disclosure level 
 Low Medium High 
High CR 0.09 0.15 0.16 
Low CR 0.12 0.04 0.14 
Difference *** *** *** 
 
 
 Disclosure level 
 Low Medium High 
High CR 0.19 0.22 0.25 
Low CR 0.25 0.07 0.24 
Difference *** *** ** 
 
Panel B: Dividend payout and creditor rights by disclosure level 
 
High disclosure Medium disclosure 
  
 High disclosure 
 High CR Low CR Difference 
Div-CF 0.16 0.14 *** 
Div-Earn 0.25 0.24 *** 
 
 Medium disclosure 
 High CR Low CR Difference 
Div-CF 0.15 0.04 *** 
Div-Earn 0.22 0.07 *** 
 
Low disclosure Notes: This figure reports the average dividend 
payout in countries classified by high, medium and 
low disclosure and high and low creditor rights. Panel 
A reports the average dividend payout by disclosure 
level and strength of creditor rights. Panel B reports 
the average dividend payout by strength of creditor 
rights for each disclosure level (i.e., high, medium and 
low disclosure). Dividend payout is measured as either 
dividends-to-cash flow or dividends-to-earnings. Low 
(Medium) disclosure ranges from 58 to 71 (72 to 76). 
High disclosure corresponds to disclosure values 
between 78 and 85. Firms belong in high (low) 
creditor rights regimes if their country level score is 
above (below or equal to) the country sample median, 
which is 2. Disclosure is from CIFAR (2005), and 
creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007) and 
correspond to values in 2002.        
 
 Low disclosure 
 High CR Low CR Difference 
Div-CF 0.09 0.12 *** 
Div-Earn 0.19 0.25 *** 
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Figure 2 
Predicted dividend payout by disclosure standard and strength of creditor rights 
Panel A: Dividend payout, disclosure levels and the strength of creditor rights 
 
Strong creditor rights  Weak creditor rights 
  
 Disclosure level 
 Low Medium High 
Div-CF 0.096 0.144 0.159 
Div-Earn 0.177 0.198 0.223 
 
 Disclosure level 
 Low Medium High 
Div-CF 0.121 0.064 0.130 
Div-Earn 0.229 0.087 0.223 
 
Panel B: Dividend payout and creditor rights by disclosure level 
 
High disclosure Medium disclosure 
  
 High disclosure 
 High CR Low CR Difference 
Div-CF 0.159 0.130 0.029 
Div-Earn 0.223 0.223 0.000 
 
 Medium disclosure 
 High CR Low CR Difference 
Div-CF 0.144 0.064 0.080 
Div-Earn 0.198 0.087 0.111 
 
Low Disclosure Notes: This figure reports the in-sample predicted 
dividends-to-cash flow (Div-CF) and dividends-to-
earnings (Div-Earn) for alternative creditor rights and 
disclosure levels using the ordinary least squares 
estimates provided in Tables 3 and 4. The 
independent variables are evaluated at the sample 
means, and the fixed effects evaluated for industrial 
firms for the year 2005. Panel A reports the predicted 
relationship between dividend payout and disclosure 
by strength of creditor rights (i.e., high and low 
creditor rights). Panel B reports the predicted 
relationship between dividend payout and creditor 
rights for each disclosure level (i.e., high, medium and 
low disclosure). Low (Medium) disclosure ranges 
from 58 to 71 (72 to 76). High disclosure corresponds 
to disclosure values between 78 and 85. Firms belong 
in high (low) creditor rights regimes if their country 
level score is above (below and equal to) the country 
sample median, which is 2. Disclosure is from CIFAR 
(2005), and creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007) 
and corresponds to values in 2002.         
 
 Low disclosure 
 High CR Low CR Difference 
Div-CF 0.096 0.121 (0.025) 
Div-Earn 0.229 0.177 (0.052) 
 
 
